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Abstract
Trade preferences provide a potential policy tool for supporting 
the integration of refugees in countries of first asylum. Thus, the 
EU-Jordan Compact, agreed following the London conference 
of February 2016 on ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’, eased 
the rules of origin for Jordanian exporters employing a 
minimum share of Syrian refugees. The debate on the use of 
trade preferences to encourage the labour-market integration 
of refugees has been reactivated by a similar proposal made 
recently by Turkey in the WTO context. The experience with 
the Qualifying Industrial Zones initiative, launched in 1996 by 
the US for Egypt and Jordan, suggests that trade preferences, if 
properly designed, can be a powerful instrument for generating 
export growth and employment. However, both this experience 
and the so far disappointing impact of the EU-Jordan agreement 
on rules of origin show the limits and drawbacks of this type 
of scheme. This Policy Brief discusses the conditions under 
which trade preferences can prove an effective instrument for 
refugee integration and puts forward some concrete policy 
recommendations.
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The EU-Jordan Scheme: Main Features 
and Performance 
The scheme agreed between the EU and Jordan, 
which entered into force on July 2016 and has an 
initial duration of 10 years, grants a more favourable 
treatment regarding the rules of origin (RoO) to 
exports from Jordanian companies employing a 
minimum share of Syrian refugees and based in one 
of eighteen designated Special Development Zones 
(SEZ) and Industrial Areas.1 In order for a company 
to benefit from the scheme, Syrian refugees must 
represent at least 15% of its workforce in the first two 
years of application, and at least 25% of it thereafter. 
Regarding the eligible products, the proposal is 
limited to a list of industrial goods. The agreed 
relaxation of the RoO reduces the local content 
required for a product exported by Jordan to enjoy 
preferential access to the EU market from 60% to 
30% of the total export value.
The EU has also agreed that if Jordan meets its own 
target, announced at the London conference, of 
formally employing 200,000 Syrian refugees across 
the economy, as measured by the number of work 
permits issued to Syrian refugees, it will consider 
extending the scheme to the entire Jordanian 
economy.  
The EU was initially reluctant to agree to this scheme 
because it represented a departure from the Pan 
Euro-Mediterranean system of diagonal cumulation 
of RoO, enshrined in the Convention signed by 23 
European and Mediterranean countries in 2013. This 
exceptional Jordan-EU scheme has been justified 
on the basis of the humanitarian and political 
imperative related to the Syrian refugee crisis. This 
explains its temporary nature and restrictions in 
terms of products and place of production. 
The main aim of the RoO scheme is to encourage 
the labour-market integration of Syrian refugees 
in Jordan. It is hoped that this will help ensure 
decent living conditions for Syrian refugees and 
ease pressure for their secondary migration, while 
1. ‘EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and Compact’, Annex to the 
Decision No. 01/2016 of the 12th EU-Jordan Association Council 
of 10/June/2017. 
facilitating their return to Syria once the political 
situation there allows it. The EU considered offering 
a similar scheme to Lebanon, but it appears that the 
Lebanese authorities were more reluctant, reflecting 
Lebanon’s special political context. 
Although, admittedly, the scheme has not been in 
effect for long and it is, therefore, too early to make 
a conclusive assessment, its results have been, to 
date, relatively disappointing. Indeed, by the end 
of October 2017, only eight factories, employing 
a total of 145 Syrian refugees, had obtained the 
authorization to export under the RoO scheme.2
The main obstacles the scheme has encountered are 
the following: first, there is a lack of companies with 
the experience, the marketing networks and the 
competitiveness for exporting to the EU the type of 
products that can benefit from the scheme. Second, 
in some cases their products do not meet EU 
technical standards for manufactured goods. Third, 
there is a lack of Syrian workers willing to work 
in the eighteen designated areas. Indeed, Syrian 
refugees fear losing their refugee status and/or the 
donor support associated with it. Also, they often 
lack an appropriate training profile as they tend to 
have professional experience and competence in 
sectors such as agriculture, construction and home 
services, which are not covered by the RoO deal. 
Finally, Jordan continues to apply a quota system 
that restricts the share of foreign workers Jordanian 
companies are allowed to employ.
Though there is a trend towards an increase in the 
number of work permits issued to Syrian refugees 
in the economy as a whole (see Figure 1), the 
large majority of the Syrian refugees working in 
Jordan continue to do so informally.3 And despite 
the positive trend, Jordan is unlikely to meet its 
announced objective of issuing 200,000 work 
permits for Syrian refugees.
2. ‘Simplification of the Rules of Origin with the European 
Union. Annual Report’, Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation of Jordan, October 2017. 
3. The situation is similar in the other main countries in the region 
hosting Syrian refugees (Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt), where 
most refugees that work do so informally.
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A Comparison with the US QIZ Initiative
The disappointing impact until now of the RoO 
scheme contrasts with the rather successful 
experience Jordan had with the Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZ) initiative, launched in 1996 
by the US. Under the QIZ programme, the US 
granted duty-free, quota-free access to Jordanian or 
Egyptian exports co-produced with Israel in export-
processing zones called QIZs and meeting certain 
content requirements. This scheme was meant to 
support the Middle East Peace Process through the 
promotion of trade between Israel and the 
two neighbouring countries with which it had 
concluded peace agreements.4
Over the first seven to nine years after the QIZs 
were introduced in Jordan, QIZ exports to the 
US boomed, accounting, in the years 2001-
2005, for 85-90% of Jordan’s exports to the US 
and for 25-30% of all Jordanian exports (see 
Figure 2). Investment flooded into the QIZs, 
particularly from Asian investors seeking to 
4. See ‘The Socio-Economic Implications of the Qualified 
Industrial Zones in Jordan’, by Ibrahim Saif, 2006; and 
‘Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan and Egypt: 
Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional 
Research Service, US Congress, August 2013, CRS 
Report R43202, pp. 3-4 https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/R43202.html. The scheme also applied to goods 
produced in the West Bank and Gaza.
gain a competitive advantage for their 
apparel exports to the US, which were still 
subjected to quotas and high tariffs under 
the WTO Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC). Accompanying the flow 
of Asian investment into the QIZs was an 
important inflow of adequately trained and 
hard-working Asians, from countries such 
as China, India and Bangladesh. The QIZs 
allowed to produce at relatively low costs 
in Jordan, while taking advantage of Israel’s 
existing marketing channels to the United 
States. 
However, this rapid development of QIZ 
exports proved unsustainable. First, the 
expiration of the ATC in 2015 (and the associated 
elimination of textile quotas) weakened the interest 
of Asian investors in producing apparel in Jordan as 
a way to access the US market and it also increased 
competition from emerging market countries in the 
US. Secondly, the gradual entry into force of the 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) concluded between 
the US and Jordan in 2001, which meant that Jordan 
no longer had to co-produce with Israel in order to 
access the US market free of duties, removed part 
of the attraction of the QIZs. Reflecting these two 
factors, exports entering the US under the QIZ 
programme declined after 2006 (see Figure 2).
Source: Estimates based on data provided by the ILO and the 
Jordanian Ministry of Labour
Sources:  USITC Dataweb and IMF Direction of Trade statistics.
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Moreover, the QIZ programme had a number 
of serious drawbacks: firstly, the initial hope 
that the QIZs would help significantly reduce 
Jordan’s high unemployment rate was not met 
since more than half of the 35,000 to 45,000 
jobs created in the QIZs were taken by foreign, 
mostly Asian workers. This reflected both their 
better training and experience with apparel 
production and their willingness to work at 
low wages, to take on long hours and to put up 
with very tough working conditions; indeed, 
most Asian workers lived in the squalid 
accommodation provided by companies within 
the QIZs themselves.5 Jordanian workers were 
less keen to work under such conditions. 
Secondly, the QIZs did not contribute much 
to the diversification of Jordan’s export base, 
nor did they create significant positive spillover 
effects into the rest of the economy in terms of 
linkages to domestic suppliers (since an important 
part of the inputs were imported), the transfer 
of new technologies or the upgrading of the skills 
of Jordanian workers. To some extent, the QIZ 
experience fits into what is sometimes referred to 
as ‘tariff or quota-jumping’ investment. After the 
‘quota-hopping’ motivation on the part of Asian 
firms was gone, much of the investment and job 
creation was reversed.
Egypt’s experience with the QIZ programme, which 
it joined in 2004, is somewhat different but, by and 
large, positive.6 Indeed, Egypt already had a well-
developed domestic textile industry and the QIZ 
programme helped preserve its apparel exports after 
the expiration of the ATC, which had sheltered its 
exports to the US through a quota. Egyptian QIZ 
exports also developed rapidly in the first six years 
after Egypt joined the QIZ programme, though they 
subsequently stagnated, reflecting the disruptions 
5. For a critical report on working conditions at the Jordanian 
QIZs, see National Labour Committee, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement Descends into Human Trafficking and Involuntary 
Servitude, 2016. 
6. See, for example, Refaat, ‘Assessing the Impact of the QIZ 
Protocol on Egypt’s Textile and Clothing Industry’, ECES 
Working Paper No. 1113, Cairo, Egyptian Center for Economic 
Studies, 2006.
caused by the 2011 Revolution (see Figure 3). And 
in contrast to Jordan’s QIZs, most workers in Egypt’s 
QIZs are Egyptian. The US and Egypt are now 
considering a reinvigoration of the QIZ programme.
Overall, the QIZ programme, despite its drawbacks, 
contributed significantly to increasing the share of 
the beneficiary countries’ exports in the US market, 
generating jobs and investment, a view that is also 
supported by some cross-country empirical studies.7
Potential Use of Trade Measures for 
Supporting Refugee and Migration Policy
The experience with the QIZs underlines the 
powerful export and employment generating effects 
trade preferences can have, if well designed and 
supported by an appropriate context, and, therefore, 
their potential as a tool for refugee and migration 
policy. The problems witnessed with the QIZs in 
Jordan, however, and the so far disappointing impact 
of the EU’s RoO scheme for Jordan should also help 
us to draw some lessons: first, beneficiary countries 
must be in a position (competitiveness, marketing 
7. See, for example, A. Carter, Y. Gong and J. B. Nugent, 
‘Measuring Trade Advantages of the Qualifying Industrial 
Zones Programme of Jordan and Egypt Offered by the United 
States for Having Signed Peace Treaties with Israel’, Topics in 
Middle Eastern and African Economies, Vol. 17, Issue No.2,  May 
2015.
 Sources:  Ministry of Trade and Industry of Egypt and IMF s´ DOT statistics.
5 ■ Encouraging the employment of refugees through trade preferences
channels, etc.) to exploit the opportunities offered 
by the trade preferences. Second, refugees must 
have a training profile that matches the one required 
by the firms benefiting from the trade preferences. 
Third, wages and labour conditions in the sectors 
covered by the trade preferences must be sufficiently 
attractive for refugees. Moreover, refugees should 
be reassured that their acceptance of formal jobs 
will not endanger their refugee status, or some of 
the humanitarian assistance they receive. Last but 
not least, legal impediments to the employment of 
refugees should be removed. 
The possible use of trade preferences to alleviate 
the refugee crisis in countries of first asylum was 
mentioned in the Strategy for Global Trade Growth 
agreed by the G-20 in July 2016, as well as in the 
European Commission’s Communication of 2016 
establishing a new Partnership Framework with 
third countries on migration.8 And it has been 
further highlighted by Turkey’s recent proposal to 
WTO members to grant preferential treatment to 
certain exports of countries hosting large number of 
Syrian refugees provided that they are manufactured 
by companies employing refugees. In a letter sent 
on 17 August 2017 to seven key WTO members, 
the Turkish minister of finance proposes that the 
WTO should agree to grant those preferences, 
while waiving the obligation under the WTO’s 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle to extend 
the same preferential treatment to similar products 
exported by other WTO members. The proposal has 
so far been acknowledged cautiously by the WTO 
countries, but it has contributed to bringing to the 
fore again the discussion on the possible use of trade 
policy measures to encourage the labour-market 
integration of refugees. 
The Turkish proposal would have to be adopted 
by consensus by the WTO Members under Article 
IX of the Marrakech Agreement, which allows for 
8. The Communication suggests making migration cooperation a 
consideration in the forthcoming evaluation of trade preferences 
under the GSP+. See p. 9 of ‘Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on 
establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries 
on Migration,’ COM(2016) 385 final, 7 June 2016.
waivers of certain obligations (including the MFN 
provisions) under exceptional circumstances, 
such as a humanitarian crisis. But, in this case, the 
preferential schemes must be temporary, as required 
by the Marrakech Agreement. This could prove a 
significant limitation as refugee crises have often 
proved to be long-lasting.
A variant of the Turkish option would be to ease the 
standard Generalised System of Preferences  (GSP) 
or the GSP+ systems for countries hosting large 
population of refugees and for exports produced 
employing a minimum share of refugees. This could 
be done in a coordinated manner by developed 
countries adhering to the GSP/GSP+ system, or 
by those of them that wished to do so.  As noted 
above, the Commission’s Communication on the 
Partnership Framework on Migration proposes that 
this matter be looked into at the next evaluation 
by the Commission of the GSP+, which is due in 
December 2017. 
Finally, the EU could consider agreeing with its 
partners under the Convention on Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean Rules of Origin of 2013 on a 
coordinated easing of the RoO for exports produced 
by countries (other than EU and EFTA countries) 
which have signed the Convention and which host 
large number of refugees. The scheme could focus 
on labour-intensive sectors and exporting firms 
would have to demonstrate, under a certification 
process, that they are employing a minimum share of 
refugees. This option would not require a consensus 
at the WTO. Indeed, since all these countries have a 
network of preferential trade agreements, it could be 
agreed bilaterally without requiring a WTO waiver 
of the MFN clause, as the EU has done for Jordan.
These alternatives are not mutually exclusive and 
some of them could be combined. But in order 
to make them more powerful and effective, the 
international donor community should support 
them with technical and financial assistance aimed 
at easing the constraints witnessed in preferential 
schemes such as the QIZs and the EU-Jordan RoO 
scheme.
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